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Thema: if anyone need some help...

  1. #1
    Benutzer
    Registriert seit
    21.03.2006
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    NRW
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    Standard if anyone need some help...

    i can help if you want ^^

    auf deutsch :
    WENN JMD HILFE BRAUCHT....
    kann ich helfen
    bin sehr gut in engisch.... daher.. einfach reinschreiben ^^
    Achtung: Dies ist ein alter Thread im Hausaufgaben Forum
    Diese Diskussion ist älter als 90 Tage. Die darin enthaltenen Informationen oder Fragen sind möglicherweise nicht mehr aktuell. Erstelle bitte zu deiner Frage ein neues Thema im Hausaufgaben Forum !!!!!
    "Man hat mich nie gefragt, ob ich leben will - also hat mir auch niemand zu sagen, wie ich mein Leben zu leben habe!"

  2. #2
    Gast

    Standard

    Ich´kann garbichts in englisch schon garnicht die gramatik ?!

  3. #3
    Neuer Benutzer Avatar von Kriiiiis
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    21.04.2006
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    BerLin
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    Dann sag' uns wo du Hilfe brauchst & wir retten dich
    MAYBE I l0ve u ,Baby <3

  4. #4
    Neuer Benutzer Avatar von Kriiiiis
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    21.04.2006
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    BerLin
    Beiträge
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    Standard

    wenn* /:
    MAYBE I l0ve u ,Baby <3

  5. #5
    badcat2602
    Gast

    Standard songtext

    It's undeniable, that we should be together
    It's unbelievable, how I used to say that I'd fall never
    It's basis you need to know you know just how I feel
    And let me show you now that I'm for real
    If all things in time, time will reveal

    bitte um übersetzung...danke

    mfg cindy
    One: you're like a dream come true
    Two: just wanna be with you
    Three: girl, it's plain to see that you're the only one for me and
    Four: repeat steps 1 thru 3
    Five: make you fall in love with me
    If ever I believe my work is done
    Then I start back at one

    It's so incredible the way things work themselves out
    And unemotional once you know what it's all about
    And undesirable for us to be apart
    I never would have made it very far
    'Cause you know you hold the keys to me heart 'cause

    One: you're like a dream come true
    Two: just wanna be with you
    Three: girl, it's plain to see that you're the only one for me and
    Four: repeat steps 1 thru 3
    Five: make you fall in love with me
    If ever I believe my work is done
    Then I start back at one

    Say farewell to the darkened night
    I see the coming of the sun
    I feel like a little child whose life has just begun
    You came and breathed new life
    Into this lonely heart of mine
    You threw out the lifeline just in the nick of time

    One: you're like a dream come true
    Two: just wanna be with you
    Three: girl, it's plain to see that you're the only one for me and
    Four: repeat steps 1 thru 3
    Five: make you fall in love with me
    If ever I believe my work is done
    Then I start back at one

    One: you're like a dream come true
    Two: just wanna be with you
    Three: girl, it's plain to see that you're the only one for me and
    Four: repeat steps 1 thru 3
    Five: make you fall in love with me
    If ever I believe my work is done
    Then I start back at one

  6. #6
    Gast

    Standard

    Hoffe mir kann jemand weiterhelfen:
    Also ich schreibe mal die Aufgabe rein.

    "Would life be better or worse without the broadcast media? Write about a week without radio,TV or the Internet."(English G2000 A6, S.21 Aufgabe 6c)

    So nun weiß ich nicht wie ich diesen Wochenablauf schreiben soll. Also so wie n Tagebuch oder wie es wäre eine Woche lang ohne Medien? Also z.B. The People would only get their information from newspaper or from other people......

  7. #7
    Gwynever
    Gast

    Standard Mayflower Compact

    Hallo zusammen,

    ich bin leider in Englisch nicht gerade eine große Leuchte und habe vorallem was die Grammatik angeht einige Schwierigkeiten, ich hoffe aber ihr könnt mir helfen und meinen Text zum thema "Mayflower-Compact" korrigieren und mir vielleicht sogar einige Ergänzungen verfassen... wäre echt super!!! Naja, hier erst mal mein Text über den Myflower-Compact:

    When the Pilgrim Fathers come to Amerika they realized that the first tries of taking residence in the New World only failt, because there was no leadership and no law. Besides they were out of the terretory of London Company, so they had to care about themselfes. Because of that they have written the Compact. The Pilgrim fathers, whos where very religious, set up there own civil gouverment, because they wanted to live under the rules of god. The Freewillen-signed-compact shows many demokratic ideas and also equal laws and justs. It is a key document in the American history.

    Wäre nett wenn ihr mir helfen könntet
    lg

  8. #8
    Gast

    Standard

    Hallo! ich brauche hilfe!
    ich versteh den text nicht und muss darüber ein summary schreiben...sollte so eine 3/4 DIN A 4 seite groß sein! es wäre echt lieb wenn ihr mir hlft! hier ist der text:
    ICH WÄRE EUCH SOOO DANKBAR!!! danke

    4.4 COVERT ACTION
    As part of the response to the embassy bombings, President Clinton signed a Memorandum of Notification authorizing the CIA to let its tribal assets use force to capture Bin Ladin and his associates. CIA officers told the tribals that the plan to capture Bin Ladin, which had been "turned off" three months earlier, was back on. The memorandum also authorized the CIA to attack Bin Ladin in other ways. Also, an executive order froze financial holdings that could be linked to Bin Ladin.101

    The counterterrorism staff at CIA thought it was gaining a better understanding of Bin Ladin and his network. In preparation for briefing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 2,Tenet was told that the intelligence community knew more about Bin Ladin's network "than about any other top tier terrorist organization."102

    The CIA was using this knowledge to disrupt a number of Bin Ladin-associated cells. Working with Albanian authorities, CIA operatives had raided an al Qaeda forgery operation and another terrorist cell in Tirana. These operations may have disrupted a planned attack on the U.S. embassy in Tirana, and did lead to the rendition of a number of al Qaeda-related terrorist operatives. After the embassy bombings, there were arrests in Azerbaijan, Italy, and Britain. Several terrorists were sent to an Arab country. The CIA described working with FBI operatives to prevent a planned attack on the U.S. embassy in Uganda, and a number of suspects were arrested. On September 16, Abu Hajer, one of Bin Ladin's deputies in Sudan and the head of his computer operations and weapons procurement, was arrested in Germany. He was the most important Bin Ladin lieutenant captured thus far. Clarke commented to Berger with satisfaction that August and September had brought the "greatest number of terrorist arrests in a short period of time that we have ever arranged/facilitated."103

    Given the President's August Memorandum of Notification, the CIA had already been working on new plans for using the Afghan tribals to capture Bin Ladin. During September and October, the tribals claimed to have tried at least four times to ambush Bin Ladin. Senior CIA officials doubted whether any of these ambush attempts had actually occurred. But the tribals did seem to have success in reporting where Bin Ladin was.104

    This information was more useful than it had been in the past; since the August missile strikes, Bin Ladin had taken to moving his sleeping place frequently and unpredictably and had added new bodyguards. Worst of all, al Qaeda's senior leadership had stopped using a particular means of communication almost immediately after a leak to the Washington Times.105 This made it much more difficult for the National Security Agency to intercept his conversations. But since the tribals seemed to know where Bin Ladin was or would be, an alternative to capturing Bin Ladin would be to mark his location and call in another round of missile strikes.

    On November 3, the Small Group met to discuss these problems, among other topics. Preparing Director Tenet for a Small Group meeting in mid-November, the Counterterrorist Center stressed, "At this point we cannot predict when or if a capture operation will be executed by our assets."106

    U.S. counterterrorism officials also worried about possible domestic attacks. Several intelligence reports, some of dubious sourcing, mentioned Washington as a possible target. On October 26, Clarke's CSG took the unusual step of holding a meeting dedicated to trying "to evaluate the threat of a terrorist attack in the United States by the Usama bin Ladin network."107The CSG members were "urged to be as creative as possible in their thinking" about preventing a Bin Ladin attack on U.S. territory. Participants noted that while the FBI had been given additional resources for such efforts, both it and the CIA were having problems exploiting leads by tracing U.S. telephone numbers and translating documents obtained in cell disruptions abroad. The Justice Department reported that the current guidelines from the Attorney General gave sufficient legal authority for domestic investigation and surveillance.108

    Though intelligence gave no clear indication of what might be afoot, some intelligence reports mentioned chemical weapons, pointing toward work at a camp in southern Afghanistan called Derunta. On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations. The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah. The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had "reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq."109 This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was "probably a direct result of the Iraq-Al Qida agreement." Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the "exact formula used by Iraq."110This language about al Qaeda's "understanding" with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998.111

    On Friday, December 4, 1998, the CIA included an article in the Presidential Daily Brief describing intelligence, received from a friendly government, about a threatened hijacking in the United States. This article was declassified at our request.

    The same day, Clarke convened a meeting of his CSG to discuss both the


    The following is the text of an item from the Presidential Daily Brief received by President William J. Clinton on December 4, 1998. Redacted material is indicated in brackets.

    SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks

    1. Reporting [-] suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad Sadiq 'Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) saying that, as of late October, the IG had completed planning for an operation in the US on behalf of Bin Ladin, but that the operation was on hold.A senior Bin Ladin operative from Saudi Arabia was to visit IG counterparts in the US soon thereafter to discuss options-perhaps including an aircraft hijacking.

    IG leader Islambuli in late September was planning to hijack a US airliner during the "next couple of weeks" to free 'Abd al-Rahman and the other prisoners, according to what may be a different source.
    The same source late last month said that Bin Ladin might implement plans to hijack US aircraft before the beginning of Ramadan on 20 December and that two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport. [-]
    2. Some members of the Bin Ladin network have received hijack training, according to various sources, but no group directly tied to Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization has ever carried out an aircraft hijacking.Bin Ladin could be weighing other types of operations against US aircraft.Accord-ing to [-] the IG in October obtained SA-7 missiles and intended to move them from Yemen into Saudi Arabia to shoot down an Egyptian plane or, if unsuccessful, a US military or civilian aircraft.

    A [-] in October told us that unspecified "extremist elements" in Yemen had acquired SA-7s. [-]
    3. [-] indicate the Bin Ladin organization or its allies are moving closer to implementing anti-US attacks at unspecified locations, but we do not know whether they are related to attacks on aircraft. A Bin Ladin associate in Sudan late last month told a colleague in Kandahar that he had shipped a group of containers to Afghanistan. Bin Ladin associates also talked about the movement of containers to Afghanistan before the East Africa bombings.

    In other [-] Bin Ladin associates last month discussed picking up a package in Malaysia. One told his colleague in Malaysia that "they" were in the "ninth month [of pregnancy]."
    An alleged Bin Ladin supporter in Yemen late last month remarked to his mother that he planned to work in "commerce" from abroad and said his impending "marriage," which would take place soon, would be a "surprise.""Commerce" and "marriage" often are codewords for terrorist attacks. [-]



    hijacking concern and the antiaircraft missile threat. To address the hijacking warning, the group agreed that New York airports should go to maximum security starting that weekend. They agreed to boost security at other East coast airports. The CIA agreed to distribute versions of the report to the FBI and FAA to pass to the New York Police Department and the airlines. The FAA issued a security directive on December 8, with specific requirements for more intensive air carrier screening of passengers and more oversight of the screening process, at all three New York City area airports.112

    The intelligence community could learn little about the source of the information. Later in December and again in early January 1999, more information arrived from the same source, reporting that the planned hijacking had been stalled because two of the operatives, who were sketchily described, had been arrested near Washington, D.C. or New York. After investigation, the FBI could find no information to support the hijack threat; nor could it verify any arrests like those described in the report. The FAA alert at the New York area airports ended on January 31, 1999.113

    On December 17, the day after the United States and Britain began their Desert Fox bombing campaign against Iraq, the Small Group convened to discuss intelligence suggesting imminent Bin Ladin attacks on the U.S. embassies in Qatar and Ethiopia. The next day, Director Tenet sent a memo to the President, the cabinet, and senior officials throughout the government describing reports that Bin Ladin planned to attack U.S. targets very soon, possibly over the next few days, before Ramadan celebrations began. Tenet said he was "greatly concerned."114

    With alarms sounding, members of the Small Group considered ideas about how to respond to or prevent such attacks. Generals Shelton and Zinni came up with military options. Special Operations Forces were later told that they might be ordered to attempt very high-risk in-and-out raids either in Khartoum, to capture a senior Bin Ladin operative known as Abu Hafs the Mauritanian-who appeared to be engineering some of the plots-or in Kandahar, to capture Bin Ladin himself. Shelton told us that such operations are not risk free, invoking the memory of the 1993 "Black Hawk down" fiasco in Mogadishu.115

    The CIA reported on December 18 that Bin Ladin might be traveling to Kandahar and could be targeted there with cruise missiles. Vessels with Tomahawk cruise missiles were on station in the Arabian Sea, and could fire within a few hours of receiving target data.116

    On December 20, intelligence indicated Bin Ladin would be spending the night at the Haji Habash house, part of the governor's residence in Kandahar. The chief of the Bin Ladin unit, "Mike," told us that he promptly briefed Tenet and his deputy, John Gordon. From the field, the CIA's Gary Schroen advised: "Hit him tonight-we may not get another chance." An urgent teleconference of principals was arranged.117

    The principals considered a cruise missile strike to try to kill Bin Ladin. One issue they discussed was the potential collateral damage-the number of innocent bystanders who would be killed or wounded. General Zinni predicted a number well over 200 and was concerned about damage to a nearby mosque. The senior intelligence officer on the Joint Staff apparently made a different calculation, estimating half as much collateral damage and not predicting damage to the mosque. By the end of the meeting, the principals decided against recommending to the President that he order a strike. A few weeks later, in January 1999, Clarke wrote that the principals had thought the intelligence only half reliable and had worried about killing or injuring perhaps 300 people. Tenet said he remembered doubts about the reliability of the source and concern about hitting the nearby mosque. "Mike" remembered Tenet telling him that the military was concerned that a few hours had passed since the last sighting of Bin Ladin and that this persuaded everyone that the chance of failure was too great.118

    Some lower-level officials were angry. "Mike" reported to Schroen that he had been unable to sleep after this decision. "I'm sure we'll regret not acting last night," he wrote, criticizing the principals for "worrying that some stray shrapnel might hit the Habash mosque and 'offend' Muslims." He commented that they had not shown comparable sensitivity when deciding to bomb Muslims in Iraq. The principals, he said, were "obsessed" with trying to get others-Saudis, Pakistanis, Afghan tribals-to "do what we won't do." Schroen was disappointed too. "We should have done it last night," he wrote. "We may well come to regret the decision not to go ahead."119 The Joint Staff's deputy director for operations agreed, even though he told us that later intelligence appeared to show that Bin Ladin had left his quarters before the strike would have occurred. Missing Bin Ladin, he said, "would have caused us a hell of a problem, but it was a shot we should have taken, and we would have had to pay the price.120

    The principals began considering other, more aggressive covert alternatives using the tribals. CIA officers suggested that the tribals would prefer to try a raid rather than a roadside ambush because they would have better control, it would be less dangerous, and it played more to their skills and experience. But everyone knew that if the tribals were to conduct such a raid, guns would be blazing. The current Memorandum of Notification instructed the CIA to capture Bin Ladin and to use lethal force only in self-defense. Work now began on a new memorandum that would give the tribals more latitude. The intention was to say that they could use lethal force if the attempted capture seemed impossible to complete successfully.121

    Early drafts of this highly sensitive document emphasized that it authorized only a capture operation. The tribals were to be paid only if they captured Bin Ladin, not if they killed him. Officials throughout the government approved this draft. But on December 21, the day after principals decided not to launch the cruise missile strike against Kandahar, the CIA's leaders urged strengthening the language to allow the tribals to be paid whether Bin Ladin was captured or killed. Berger and Tenet then worked together to take this line of thought even further.122

    They finally agreed, as Berger reported to President Clinton, that an extraordinary step was necessary. The new memorandum would allow the killing of Bin Ladin if the CIA and the tribals judged that capture was not feasible (a judgment it already seemed clear they had reached). The Justice Department lawyer who worked on the draft told us that what was envisioned was a group of tribals assaulting a location, leading to a shoot-out. Bin Ladin and others would be captured if possible, but probably would be killed. The administration's position was that under the law of armed conflict, killing a person who posed an imminent threat to the United States would be an act of self-defense, not an assassination. On Christmas Eve 1998, Berger sent a final draft to President Clinton, with an explanatory memo. The President approved the document.123

    Because the White House considered this operation highly sensitive, only a tiny number of people knew about this Memorandum of Notification. Berger arranged for the NSC's legal adviser to inform Albright, Cohen, Shelton, and Reno. None was allowed to keep a copy. Congressional leaders were briefed, as required by law. Attorney General Reno had sent a letter to the President expressing her concern: she warned of possible retaliation, including the targeting of U.S. officials. She did not pose any legal objection. A copy of the final document, along with the carefully crafted instructions that were to be sent to the tribals, was given to Tenet.124

    A message from Tenet to CIA field agents directed them to communicate to the tribals the instructions authorized by the President: the United States preferred that Bin Ladin and his lieutenants be captured, but if a successful capture operation was not feasible, the tribals were permitted to kill them. The instructions added that the tribals must avoid killing others unnecessarily and must not kill or abuse Bin Ladin or his lieutenants if they surrendered. Finally, the tribals would not be paid if this set of requirements was not met.125

    The field officer passed these instructions to the tribals word for word. But he prefaced the directions with a message: "From the American President down to the average man in the street, we want him [Bin Ladin] stopped." If the tribals captured Bin Ladin, the officer assured them that he would receive a fair trial under U.S. law and be treated humanely. The CIA officer reported that the tribals said they "fully understand the contents, implications and the spirit of the message" and that that their response was, "We will try our best to capture Bin Ladin alive and will have no intention of killing or harming him on purpose." The tribals explained that they wanted to prove that their standards of behavior were more civilized than those of Bin Ladin and his band of terrorists. In an additional note addressed to Schroen, the tribals noted that if they were to adopt Bin Ladin's ethics, "we would have finished the job long before," but they had been limited by their abilities and "by our beliefs and laws we have to respect."126

    Schroen and "Mike" were impressed by the tribals' reaction. Schroen cabled that the tribals were not in it for the money but as an investment in the future of Afghanistan. "Mike" agreed that the tribals' reluctance to kill was not a "showstopper." "From our view," he wrote, "that seems in character and fair enough."127

    Policymakers in the Clinton administration, including the President and his national security advisor, told us that the President's intent regarding covert action against Bin Ladin was clear: he wanted him dead. This intent was never well communicated or understood within the CIA. Tenet told the Commission that except in one specific case (discussed later), the CIA was authorized to kill Bin Ladin only in the context of a capture operation. CIA senior managers, operators, and lawyers confirmed this understanding. "We always talked about how much easier it would have been to kill him," a former chief of the Bin Ladin unit said.128

    In February 1999, another draft Memorandum of Notification went to President Clinton. It asked him to allow the CIA to give exactly the same guidance to the Northern Alliance as had just been given to the tribals: they could kill Bin Ladin if a successful capture operation was not feasible. On this occasion, however, President Clinton crossed out key language he had approved in December and inserted more ambiguous language. No one we interviewed could shed light on why the President did this. President Clinton told the Commission that he had no recollection of why he rewrote the language.129

    Later in 1999, when legal authority was needed for enlisting still other collaborators and for covering a wider set of contingencies, the lawyers returned to the language used in August 1998, which authorized force only in the context of a capture operation. Given the closely held character of the document approved in December 1998, and the subsequent return to the earlier language, it is possible to understand how the former White House officials and the CIA officials might disagree as to whether the CIA was ever authorized by the President to kill Bin Ladin.130

    The dispute turned out to be somewhat academic, as the limits of available legal authority were not tested. Clarke commented to Berger that "despite 'expanded' authority for CIA's sources to engage in direct action, they have shown no inclination to do so." He added that it was his impression that the CIA thought the tribals unlikely to act against Bin Ladin and hence relying on them was "unrealistic."131 Events seemed to bear him out, since the tribals did not stage an attack on Bin Ladin or his associates during 1999.

    The tribals remained active collectors of intelligence, however, providing good but not predictive information about Bin Ladin's whereabouts. The CIA also tried to improve its intelligence reporting on Bin Ladin by what Tenet's assistant director for collection, the indefatigable Charles Allen, called an "all-out, all-agency, seven-days-a-week" effort.132 The effort might have had an effect. On January 12, 1999, Clarke wrote Berger that the CIA's confidence in the tribals' reporting had increased. It was now higher than it had been on December 20.133

    In February 1999, Allen proposed flying a U-2 mission over Afghanistan to build a baseline of intelligence outside the areas where the tribals had coverage. Clarke was nervous about such a mission because he continued to fear that Bin Ladin might leave for someplace less accessible. He wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin's having met with Iraqi officials, who "may have offered him asylum." Other intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar, had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq. If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein's service, and it would be "virtually impossible" to find him. Better to get Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, Clarke declared.134 Berger suggested sending one U-2 flight, but Clarke opposed even this. It would require Pakistani approval, he wrote; and "Pak[istan's] intel[ligence service] is in bed with" Bin Ladin and would warn him that the United States was getting ready for a bombing campaign: "Armed with that knowledge, old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad."135 Though told also by Bruce Riedel of the NSC staff that Saddam Hussein wanted Bin Ladin in Baghdad, Berger conditionally authorized a single U-2 flight. Allen meanwhile had found other ways of getting the information he wanted. So the U-2 flight never occurred.136

  9. #9
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    “Mary Dilworth. The Factory“

    The Factory
    I have always hated the factory. It has a gaunt steel frame like a skeleton. I've often imagined it
    without its red bricks, just an etching of black against a red sky.
    Of course, I've never said anything about this to anyone. Especially to Eric. You see, he
    5 loves the factory. He would like to put up his sign in those flashing neon lights that the city firms
    can afford. He saw a rainbow once over a petrol station there. I think he would have sold almost
    anything to have one of those on his roof.
    Every day he is up early. He sings in the shower and eats his breakfast quietly. He always reads
    the business section of the newspaper, then quarters it neatly.
    10 His days are like that. In four parts.
    The first is the morning, which I've mentioned. Then there's the day at the factory.
    That's in two: the morning and the afternoon. He uses the telephone to tell me when it's time for lunch. Just
    two rings. That's his code. Then five minutes later he's at the door, letting himself in.
    27
    He reads at lunch, usually one of the classics. He didn't have much education.
    15 In fact, that's why I met him. We worked at the same factory, ten miles out of town. It
    manufactured shoes and boots. I was the boss's secretary, and Eric worked the floor.
    I'll always remember that first day. He was nervous, tried not to show it, but his hands shook.
    His hair was brown, his eyes were brown, and the factory overalls were brown. He almost faded
    into the background of brown leather shoes. Which was quite funny at the time.
    20 But I was describing his day. And he's not brown any more. Streaks of gray and a balding patch
    which he rakes over, spreading the hairs thinly across it. And he wears a suit. Usually gray, with a
    red handkerchief in the pocket. I suppose his eyes are still the same color, but I can't tell you. If
    you asked me, 1 just couldn't tell you.
    I did notice they were red tonight, which was unusual, but then the whole day was different.
    25 As though the four quarters came together and just rolled away.
    I could draw the second half of his day with my eyes closed.
    In the afternoon, he has a cup of tea in his office, then he works until six o'clock.
    Two rings on the telephone mean he's coming home for dinner. He has a good appetite and
    enjoys his food.
    30 In the evening he likes quiet. He always says that after such a busy day at the factory, he
    needs to sit and think. Which he does, with his eyes closed, his elbow on the chair, and his thumb
    and one finger pressed against his forehead. Or sometimes he just sits and stares into space.
    Eric always goes to bed early. He feels fresh then for the next day.
    But now the next day won't come. It won't be Eric's day, and his eyes are red. I've never seen
    35 him cry before.
    I said this day was different. It's night now, and soon the dawn will come. In the night, the sky
    was red. A brilliant red. That was beautiful. Black against red. Like a devil with horns or the
    final crashing chords of a great concerto.
    I loved it. Black skeleton of steel in a fiery night. Of course the fire brigade came. I didn't call
    40 them. It was beautiful just watching the sky burning. I don't think I will ever forget it. Eric was
    asleep.
    They came to tell us as soon as they arrived. Eric knew straight away it was all over.
    I love the night. Sometimes I stay up for hours, savoring it. The stars and that great arc of sky.
    The immense pattern, the changing moods of wind.
    45 Tonight it was special. It was different. And I feel very tired. But happy. An exhilarated feeling, a
    prickling right down my spine.
    Nobody knows how the fire started. Accidental, they say. It happens all the time.





    1 gaunt very thin - frame here: interior structure made of bars - 2 brick stone used for building houses -
    etching picture printed from a metal plate; here: outline - 9 to quarter to fold up twice, to a quarter of its size -
    neat tidy, careful - 16 to work the floor (AE) to have a job as an ordinary worker - 18 to fade here: to
    disappear
    20 streak [i:l long stripe - gray (AE) grey (BE) - balding beginning to lose the hair on the head - patch spot -
    21 to rake over to cover - 31 elbow the part of the arm connecting the upper and lower half - thumb the short
    thick finger that is set apart from the other four - 32 forehead the part of the face above the eyes and below the
    hair - 38 chord Akkord - 42 straight away at once - 43 to savor (AE)/savour (BE) to enjoy - arc part of a
    circle, curve - 44 immense very large - pattern regularly repeated form (Muster)- 45 exhilarated very happy
    and excited - 46 spine row of bones down s.o.'s back that supports the body - 47 accidental not intended
    28

  10. #10
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    Kann mir jemand von euch bitte eine summary schreiben über den text "the factory" ??
    das wäre sehr hilfreich

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